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Abstract: Our data gets collected every day by governments, different organi-
zations and individuals for data mining. It is often not known who the receiving
part of data is and whether data receiver can be trusted. Therefore it is necessary
to anonymize data in a way what it would be not possible to identify persons
from released data sets. This master thesis will discuss different threats to pri-
vacy, discuss and compare different privacy-preserving methods to mitigate these
threats. The thesis will give an overview of different possible implementations for
these privacy-preserving methods. The other output of this thesis is educational
purpose software that allows students to learn and practice privacy-preserving
methods. The final part of this thesis is a validation of designed software.
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Prototüüp privaatsust säilitava andmete avalikustamise õp-
pimiseks
Lühikokkuvõte:
Erinevad organisatsioonid, valitsusasutused, firmad ja üksikisikud koguvad and-
meid, mida on võimalik hiljem uute teadmiste saamiseks andmekaeve meetoditega
töödelda. Töötlejaks ei tarvitse olla andmte koguja. Sageli ei ole teada andmetööt-
leja usaldusväärsus, mistõttu on oluline tagada, et avalikustatud andmetest po-
leks enam võimalik tagantjärgi privaatseid isikuandmeid identifitseerida. Selleks,
et isikuid ei oleks enam võimalik identifitseerida, tuleb enne andmete töötlejate-
le väljastamist rakendada privaatsust säilitavaid meetodeid. Käesolevas lõputöös
kirjeldatakse erinevaid ohte privaatsusele, meetodeid nende ohtude ennetamiseks,
võrreldakse neid meetodeid omavahel ja kirjeldatakse erinevaid viise, kuidas and-
meid anonümiseerida. Lõputöö teiseks väljundiks on õpitarkvara, mis võimaldab
tudengitel antud valdkonnaga tutvuda. Lõputöö viimases osas valideeritakse loo-
dud tarkvara.
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Definitions and Acronyms
PPDP - Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing.
QID - Quasi-Identifier
CSV - Comma Separated File.
Import table - read table from CSV file into program memory.
Export table - write table from program memory to CSV file.
EMD - Earth Mover Distance
Open table - select table that is in program’s memory to for further processing.
Identifier column - column that is either primary key for table row (such as ’Id’)
or that is part of table key (such as ’first name’ or ’last name’).
Attribute type - type of attribute (column) that is represented by that column.
One of the following: Explicit_identifier, Quasi_identifier, Sensitive_attributes
or Non-sensitive_attributes.
Attribute action - action to take to this attribute (column). One of the follow-
ing: Keep as is, Remove or generalize.
TCP - Transmission Control Protocol.
Attribute - characteristic of data table. In other words column name. Examples:
Id, Name, Age, Job, etc.
JSON - JavaScript Object Notation.
HTML - HyperText Markup Language.
CSS - Cascading Style Sheets.
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1 Introduction
Data mining is often used to gain knowledge about our everyday life. Our data
gets collected daily and then either sold or given to data miners. Digital informa-
tion is collected by governments, organizations and individuals. For example in
California hospitals are even required to publish data by the law to publish demo-
graphic data. Different parties collect and publish different data. Original data
from data publisher’s database often contains personal information about people
whose data was published. This will cause threats to our privacy because not all
data miners are trustworthy. It may happen that data publisher does not even
know if they can trust data recipients. This means that data recipient might be
attacker. An attacker could find a victim from one record by some identifying
attributes and then link the row in the first table with a row from the second table
using attributes that are common for both tables. This can lead to loss of privacy
due to record linkage as an attacker could misuse the data. This is a problem be-
cause person’s private data could help an attacker to take advantage of victim. For
example, an attacker could impersonate victim in order to get some prescription
drug or even commit a crime so that guilt would fall on victim instead. Therefore
it necessary to publish it in a way that preserves privacy. Privacy-preserving data
publishing offers means to publish data in a way that is still useful for data miners
but preserves privacy of individual whose data was published [FWCY10].
It is necessary to protect the people from potential consequences of privacy link-
age. Privacy-preserving data publishing methods will preserve person’s privacy
by making person not identifiable from published data. This can mean removing
of identifying attributes such as first name and last name but in addition to that
there different methods to generalize data in the way that makes it even harder
to identify some specific person from a dataset. Such operations will improve pro-
tection of privacy while still keeping data useful for data miners.
Since there are different methods for anonymizing data, it is hard to know which
method is good for which situation. The aim of this master’s thesis is to compare
the different methods to each other to find out which the strengths and weaknesses
of each method. In the first part of this master’s thesis author gives an overview of
different threats to privacy, and for each threat one or more solution and compar-
ison of these solutions by highlighting their strong and weak points. The second
part of this master’s thesis will be an educational program that lets users to try
different privacy-preserving methods on different datasets to see and learn how
they work. The third part of this thesis will be validation of this software.
The information is obtained by reading different articles on privacy-preserving data
publishing [FWCY10].
The first chapter gives an overview of privacy-preserving data publishing and re-
lated work. The second chapter describes different threats to privacy that can
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occur when data is published in its original form and discusses and compares some
privacy-preserving methods. The third chapter discusses and compares different
anonymization operations, that can be used to make data to meet the requirements
set by privacy-preserving methods. The fourth chapter specifies the educational
purpose prototype application which is intended to help students to learn more
about privacy-preserving data publishing. The fifth chapter validates the useful-
ness of prototype using feedback that was received from students who used this
program. In addition to that, this chapter also discusses possible threats to valid-
ity.
This thesis will address the following research questions:
MRQ How to publish personal data in a way that preserves privacy?
RQ1 What are the risks of publishing personal data and what methods can be
used to mitigate these risks?
RQ2 What anonymization operations implement privacy-preserving methods?
RQ3 What is the prototype for learning these privacy-preserving methods?
RQ4 What is usability of the prototype?
Research questions 1 and 2 are answered by doing systematic literature review and
summarizing reviewed literature in the chapters 1 and 2. Research question 3 is
answered by designing and implementing a prototype application for learning a
privacy-preserving data publishing.
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2 Privacy Assets, Threats and Mitigations
This chapter will answer to research question "What are the risks of publishing per-
sonal data and what methods can be used to mitigate these risks". Since the data
is collected by different parties every day and it is not possible to know whether
or not data miner is trustworthy it is necessary to apply different anonymization
operations on data before it is published. If data is not anonymized it can be used
to perform different attacks. For example, AOL(America Online) query logs were
published but removed after reidentification of a searcher [FWCY10]. Anonymiza-
tion is a set of operations on data that are designed to hide the identity of the
data owner. In this chapter we are going to analyze different threats to privacy
and anonymization methods [FWCY10].
2.1 Related Work
Different research works have been done in the field of privacy-preserving data
publishing for years. In [Swe02] where are discussed the threat of publishing data,
re-identification of the victim and a privacy-preserving method called k-anonymity.
In [WF06] the authors show the weakness of k-Anonymity and propose (X, Y)-
Anonymity as a solution. In [NCN07] authors extend the definition of k-Anonymity
to work with relational data and define a new method called MultiRelational k-
Anonymity. The authors also explain why k-Anonymity cannot be used on rela-
tional data. In [MKGV07] the authors discuss different attacks on k-Anonymity
and propose l-Diversity to mitigate these attacks. In [LLV07] the authors dis-
cuss record linkage and attribute linkage, show the limitation of l-Diversity and
proposes t-Closeness to overcome this limitation. Cynthia Dwork has published
several papers about -Differential privacy. From these papers [Dwo06] was used
for writing about -Differential privacy in this master’s thesis. In [Dwo06] is stated
that risk to person’s privacy must not increase as a result of participating in data
release which is the essence of -Differential privacy. In addition to that, there
are several papers that discuss how these privacy-preserving methods could be
implemented. Article [FWCY10] summarizes these papers and also other papers
that I have not mentioned. Privacy-preserving Data Publishing: A Survey of Re-
cent Developments was used as a starting point for writing this masters thesis and
other papers were used to gain additional information. Papers that have been
published in this field are mainly informative. They explain different attacks to
privacy such as record linkage, attribute linkage or table linkage. Published work
also proposes mitigation methods for such attacks such as k-Anonymity, (X, Y)-
Anonymity, MultiRelational k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-Closeness, -Differential
privacy and distributional privacy. Studies also propose algorithms for anonymiz-
ing data released [FWCY10].
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However by thesis author’s observation research papers do not compare differ-
ent privacy-preserving methods by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses.
Research papers mainly highlight weaknesses of previously known methods and
after that focus on proposing an other method. In this master’s thesis author
will compare privacy-preserving methods to each other to find out what are the
weaknesses and strengths of different privacy-preserving methods. This research
work will also compare the purposes of different privacy-preserving methods and
the author of this thesis will write a prototype application that allows users to try
different methods.
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing Methods
Generally in PPDP (Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing), the table that is to be
published is in the following form
T (Explicit_identifier,Quasi_identifier,
Sensitive_attributes,Non− sensitive_attributes)
Where Explicit_identifier is a list of attributes that directly identify the person
such as name, person code, address, social security number and so on. Quasi_identifier
(QID) is a list of attributes whose combination could possibly identify the person
such as sex, age, job, zip-code and so on. The combination of quasi-identifiers
can either specify the unique record from a second table or small set of records.
Sensitive_attributes are sensitive attributes that are specific to the person such
as diseases or salary. Although there can be several attributes that can belong to
sensitive attribute set, in this thesis we only cover privacy-preserving methods that
are designed for tables that have only one sensitive attribute. Non-sensitive at-
tributes are all other attributes that do not fit into previous categories [FWCY10].
In this master’s thesis we discuss three different types of threats.
1. Record linkage attack which in other words is identity disclosure. After
successful record linkage attack, attacker knows whether or not his victim is
present in the data release.
2. Attribute linkage which means that value of some sensitive attribute is re-
vealed about the victim.
3. Table linkage occurs when attacker will get to know whether or not victim
is present in given table. The difference from record linkage is that in table
linkage attacker does not need to find exact victim’s record.
Record linkage can often lead to attribute linkage [LLV07].
The following table will give an overview of threats to privacy and methods for
each threat that can be used to mitigate the threats.
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Table 1: Privacy models (adapted from [FWCY10])
Privacy Model Attack ModelRecord Linkage Attribute Linkage Table Linkage
k-Anonymity x
(X, Y)-Anonymity x
MultiR k-Anonymity x
l-Diversity x x
t-Closeness x
-Differential Privacy x
Distributional Privacy x
From table 1 it can be seen that most of the privacy-preserving methods protect
against specific attack type. The only exception of methods discussed in this thesis
is l-Diversity which protects against both record linkage and attribute linkage.
2.3 Record Linkage
Record linkage is an attack where attacker tries to map one or more records re-
leased dataset to victim. To do this, attacker will try to match victims’ QID from
released data. This could lead to exposure of data owner’s private data such as
political or religious views for example [FWCY10].
The following tables are to demonstrate record linkage attack.
Table 2: Work (adapted from [FWCY10])
First name Last name Age Gender City Work
Juhan Olev 39 Male Elva Programmer
John Doe 35 Male Elva Analyst
Gebede Ahmed 37 Male Tartu Developer
Beth Smith 41 Female Tartu Designer
Laura Saar 44 Female Elva Painter
Table 3: Disability (adapted from [FWCY10])
Age Gender City Disability
39 Male Elva No
35 Male Elva Yes
37 Male Tartu No
41 Female Tartu Yes
44 Female Elva No
In the following two examples we have {First name, Last name} in role of ex-
plicit_identifier, {Age, Gender, City} in role of Quasi_Identifier, and {Work}
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from table 2 and {Disability} from table 3 in role of Sensitive_Attribute. Both
tables 2 and 3 contain common attributes Age, Gender, City. These attributes
individually do not specify any individuals, but when together they can either
specify person uniquely or leave attacker with only few options to choose from.
Example 2.1. (Adapted from [FWCY10]). Suppose that attacker has access
to table 2 and table 3. If both tables contain same people then attacker could join
these tables together on Age, Gender and City. This way attacker can learn
whether victim has disability or not.
It is also possible to use record linkage attack where only one table is available.
Example 2.2. (Adapted from [FWCY10]). Suppose that attacker knows
victims Quasi_Identifier (QID). In that case, attacker can find out if the victim
has a disability because knowing the combination of Age, Gender and City will
uniquely define the row in tables 2 and 3.
The following chapters will discuss different methods to mitigate record linkage
attacks what were shown in examples 2.1 and 2.2.
2.3.1 k-Anonymity
Suppose that data publisher wants to publish data to data miners. This will raise
a question how to publish this data in a way that attacker would not be able to
uniquely identify the victim from published data. One way of doing this is to
take one or more quasi-identifiers and generalize them into groups so that data
owner would not be identifiable inside that group. For example, if attribute job
is part of QID then programmer, analyst and tester could be generalized to a
software developer. Different ages of data owner could be generalized into 5-year
intervals. For example, ages 21, 23 or 24 years could be generalized to 20-25 years.
After such generalization exact values will be replaced with generalized valued.
This will prevent record linkage trough QID. The idea described above is called
k-anonymity. Next the author will give more formal definition [Swe02].
Definition 2.1. Let T be published table and k number of records. Table T is
k-anonymous when record owner is not distinguishable from least k-1 other record
owners. [Swe02]
In other words, k-anonymity means that groups size on QID is k or more. There-
fore probability of linking victim trough QID is 1
k
or less. [FWCY10]
The number of attributes in QID can affect the value of k for which table satisfies
k-Anonymity. For example, if we take QID = Age, Gender we can make a 2-
anonymous table of table 3 by generalizing Age to intervals with a size of five.
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Table 4: 2-anonymous disability (adapted from [FWCY10])
Age Gender City Disability
[35-40) Male Elva No
[35-40) Male Elva Yes
[35-40) Male Tartu No
[40-45) Female Tartu Yes
[40-45) Female Tartu No
According to definition (2.1) table 4 is 2-anonymous because the smallest group
on QID of indistinguishable records has a size of 2. If we would take QID to be
{Age, Gender, City} then, however, our table would only be 1-anonymous because
there is no other male whose age is in range 35 to 40 years and who lives in Tartu.
From table 4 we cannot tell whether the male with a disability is Juhan or John.
However, since the table is only 2-anonymous we can assume the name of record
owner with 50% of probability. Hence the greater the k the less probability attacker
has to successfully link records from different tables. Also the more elements we
include in QID the better protection k-anonymity would provide. The downside
of choosing more attributes in QID is that the data would become more distorted
compared to choosing fewer attributes in QID [FWCY10].
The disadvantage of k-anonymity is that it causes data distortion. For example
our 2-anonymous table above will not give us exact information about age, instead
it gives us the age range. Such distortion might make information less valuable for
data miners [Swe02].
2.3.2 (X, Y)-Anonymity
K-anonymity assumes that each individual appears only once in a data table.
However when the same person appears more than one time in a data table, k-
anonymity may not provide required anonymity.
Example 2.3. One person may have many different diseases. This could mean
that hospital’s data set may contain more than one row for given person. If a
person has 4 diseases then that person would have 4 rows in table and thus k-
anonymity could give him anonymity of k
4
instead of k.
To solve this problem (X, Y)-Anonymity was proposed by Wang and Fung in 2006
[WF06] where X and Y are disjoint sets of attributes.
Definition 2.2. Let X and Y be disjoint sets of attributes in table T. When each
value from set X has to be linked to k or more values from Y then table T is (X,
Y)-Anonymous.
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This means that if X represents some QID and Y represents identifier (person) then
(X, Y)-Anonymity would require that each QID group would represent at least k
different persons. This would guarantee that QID groups would offer anonymity
of k [WF06].
2.3.3 MultiRelational k-Anonymity
So far we have looked different methods to anonymize data that consists of a
single table. In this section we are going to discuss method called multirelational
k-Anonymity [NCN07].
In often cases data is kept in multiple relational tables instead of a single table.
In relational tables, not all sensitive or identifying information is kept in each
table separately. Instead there is one table that contains identifying information
and other tables would refer to it. In this case k-anonymity may not be the best
option. It may fail to ensure anonymity or cause too much distortion making data
useless for data miners [NCN07]. The example below will illustrate multirelational
database.
Table 5: Person (adapted from [NCN07])
Id First name Last name Age Gender City
1 Juhan Olev 39 Male Elva
2 John Doe 35 Male Elva
3 Gebede Ahmed 37 Male Tartu
4 Beth Smith 41 Female Tartu
5 Laura Saar 44 Female Elva
Table 6: Work (adapted from [NCN07])
Id Work
1 Programmer
2 Analyst
3 Developer
4 Designer
5 Painter
Table 7: Disability (adapted from [NCN07])
Id Disability
1 No
2 Yes
3 No
4 Yes
5 No
Table 5 Person is used to store the details of a specific person such as name, age,
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etc. Table 6 Work will not store any other identifying details other than Id that
refers to Id column of Person table 5. Likewise the Disability table 7 only stores
Disability attribute and Id that refers to Person table 5. When data comes from
multiple tables like these, it is necessary to guarantee that it would be difficult
to link records between those tables. For such case multi-relational anonymity
[NCN07] is proposed.
Definition 2.3. (Multirelational k-anonymity) Let PT be Person-specific
table, T1, ..., Tn be a set of tables that linked to PT using identifier from PT,
T = PT on T1 on ... on Tn be join of all tables and o the owner of record in table
T. We say that table T is k-anonymous if for each record owner o there is at least
k − 1 record owners with same QID [FWCY10].
In example tables above PT is Person table, T1 is Work table and T2 is Disability
table. In this case table T would have columns {Id, First name, Last name, Age,
Gender, City, Work, Disability }. Choosing QID would depend on to whom data
is published [NCN07].
2.3.4 Comparison of Solutions
In this chapter, author will compare highlight strong and weak points of each
privacy-preserving method discussed so far.
K-anonymity is designed for single data table where each row represents a dif-
ferent person. In situations where the same person is present in multiple rows
k-anonymity may not offer sufficient protection. In the case of relational database,
k-anonymity might distort data too much or leak privacy. Another weakness of k-
anonymity is that attacker can still successfully infer the value of sensitive attribute
when the diversity of sensitive attribute in QID group is too small [FWCY10]
[MKGV07].
(X, Y)-Anonymity is designed for situations where the same person is present
in multiple rows. (X, Y)-Anonymity ensures that each QID group has at least
k different values meaning that it would be more difficult to guess some specific
attribute value for given QID group [FWCY10].
Multirelational k-anonymity is designed for relational databases. Compared
to k-anonymity multirelational k-anonymity protects privacy in multirelational
database sufficiently while still keeping it useful for data miners [FWCY10].
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Table 8: Comparison table
Criteria k-Anonymity (X, Y)-Anonymity Multirelational
k-Anonymity
Purpose Single table where each
row represents a dis-
tinct person.
Single table where one
person can appear in
multiple rows.
Multiple relational ta-
bles.
Weakness Does not guarantee di-
versity of sensitive at-
tribute meaning that
attribute linkage is still
possible.
Does not guarantee suf-
ficient privacy when
person is present in
multiple rows.
Does not offer sufficient
privacy or renders ta-
ble useless for datamin-
ers when used on multi
relational database.
In practice, privacy
does not depend much
on QID size but rather
on number of distinct
values in QID group
[XT06].
Does not offer sufficient
privacy or renders ta-
ble useless for datamin-
ers when used on multi
relational database.
Does not guarantee di-
versity of sensitive at-
tribute.
Does not guarantee di-
versity of sensitive at-
tribute.
Does not guarantee suf-
ficient privacy when
person is present in
multiple rows.
Strength Easier to understand
and check than (X, Y)-
Anonymity
Works wit tables where
the same owner is
present in multiple
rows.
Does not over or under
anonymize relational
data.
Although in table 8 k-anonymity has more weaknesses than other privacy-preserving
methods. (X, Y)-Anonymity and Multirelational k-Anonymity overcome these is-
sues by adding additional requirements to k-Anonymity.
2.4 Attribute Linkage
Privacy-preserving methods that this master’s thesis covered in previous chapters
work by hiding data owner in a number of other data owners with same QID.
However this may not offer sufficient protection to privacy [FWCY10].
Example 2.4. For example when hospital releases a dataset of patient’s diseases.
In some QID group there could be four people with HIV and one person with
AIDS. In this case, even if attacker does not manage to exactly identify target’s
record, he can guess with 80% of confidence that his target has HIV [FWCY10].
15
Such release is still k-anonymous but it still does not offer sufficient protection to
privacy.
Attribute linkage is attack where attacker who knows QID of his target can infer
sensitive attribute of target based on sensitive attributes in target’s QID group.
The main idea of methods in the following chapters is to reduce the correlation
between QID and sensitive attribute [FWCY10].
2.4.1 l-Diversity
L-diversity is proposed by Machanavajjhala [MKGV07] to prevent attribute linkage
attack. L-diversity requires that each QID group has at least l different sensitive
attribute values. This requirement also satisfies the requirement of k-anonymity
where k = l. L-diversity differs from k-anonymity for that while k-anonymity re-
quires a group to contain at least k individuals with same QID, l-diversity requires
a group to contain at least l different sensitive attributes [AY08] [FWCY10].
Next, the author of this will explain two instances of l-diversity called entropy
l-diversity and recursive (c, l)-diversity.
L-diversity does not offer sufficient protection against probabilistic attack because
some attributes appear more often than others. In probabilistic, the sensitive
attribute is inferred because it appears more frequently than other sensitive at-
tributes and therefore attacker can infer that his victim must also have that value
for the sensitive attribute. To protect the record owner against such attacks there
are stronger notations of l-diversity called entropy l-diversity [FWCY10].
Definition 2.4. Table T is entropy l-diverse when for each QID group
−
∑
s∈S
P (qid, s) · log(P (qid, s)) ≥ log(l) (1)
Where s is sensitive attribute P (qid, s) is a probability that random person from
that QID group has sensitive attribute s [FWCY10].
As a result of this condition, every QID block has to have at least l different
sensitive attribute values.
Example 2.5. Let QID = {Age,Gender} in table 4 and P (qid, s) be proba-
bility that sensitive attribute ’disability’ has value of yes. Using formula 1 find
entropy in first QID group −1
3
log(1
3
) − 2
3
log(2
3
) = log(1.9) and for second QID
group −1
2
log(1
2
)− 1
2
log(1
2
) = log(2). Therefore when QID = {Age,Gender} table
4 will satisfy entropy l-diversity when l < 1.9. (adapted from [FWCY10])
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Recursive (c,l)-diversity assures that most common attribute does not appear too
frequently in data release and lease common attributes does not appear too rarely
[FWCY10].
For the following two definitions author will first define some variables. Let S
sensitive attribute and s1, ...sn possible values of S in given QID group. Lets
sort counts of the occurrences of s1, ...sn in descending order and name the new
sequence r1, ..., rn where r1 is the most frequent element of S and rn be the least
frequent element of S. Let c be some constant chosen by data publisher [MKGV07]
[FWCY10].
Definition 2.5. We say that QID block is recursive (c, l)-diverse when r1 <
c · (rl + rl+1 + ...+ rn) [MKGV07].
Definition 2.6. We say that table T is recursive (c, l)-diverse when every QID
group is (c, l)-recursive [MKGV07].
Limitation of l-diversity is that it assumes that each sensitive attribute comes
from uniform distribution. When data is skewed, l-diversity may cause data loss.
[FWCY10]
Example 2.6. Suppose we have data of 1000 patients and sensitive attribute
disease. Lets also suppose that only 5 patients have HIV and others have all flu
for disease. To satisfy k-anonymity where k = l we need at lease one patient who
has HIV in each QID group. This means that data loss is high [FWCY10].
2.4.2 t-Closeness
Similarly to previous example t-Closeness was proposed to prevent attribute link-
age.
Example 2.7. suppose that in the dataset the value 90% of people have sensitive
value a and 10% have sensitive value b. In such table there could be QID that still
satisfies l-diversity requirement but where 50% of sensitive values are b. In that
case person from that QID group could be inferred to have attribute b with 50%
of confidence.
T-closeness was proposed to overcome skewness problem that was described in
example 2.7. T-closeness requires that distribution of sensitive attribute in QID
is similar to the distribution of that same attribute in the overall table. A table
satisfies t-closeness when all QID groups satisfy t-closeness. T-closeness uses the
Earth Mover Distance (EMD) to measure the closeness between two distributions
of sensitive values. T-closeness requires that this distance is less than or equal to
t. [LLV07] [FWCY10].
T-closeness has the following limitations:
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1. Specification of different protection levels is not flexible.
2. EMD function does not prevent attribute linkage on numerical attributes.
3. Enforcing t-closeness would reduce the data usefulness because it requires
the distribution to be same in all QID groups.
2.4.3 Comparison of Solutions
In this chapter author will compare methods for preventing attribute linkage.
L-diversity was designed to overcome weaknesses of k-anonymity, however it will
not offer sufficient protection to privacy when a distribution of values of a sen-
sitive attribute in some QID group is different from the distribution of sensitive
attributes in the table. [LLV07].
To overcome this weakness of l-diversity t-closeness was proposed. There are
several problems with t-closeness as it can reduce the usefulness of data or threaten
privacy when the sensitive attribute is numerical [LLV07].
Table 9: Comparison table
Criteria l-diversity t-closeness
Purpose To prevent attribute linkage
for which k-anonymity is not
enough.
To prevent attribute linkage in
cases where l-diversity does not
offer enough protection.
Weakness Does not work when distribution
of sensitive attribute is skewed.
Knowing about global distribu-
tion of sensitive attribute can
help attacker to assume sensitive
value for victim
Diversity requirement does not
take into account diversity re-
quirement [LLV07].
No good way defining protection
level.
EMD function does not offer pro-
tection when sensitive attribute
is numerical.
Strict requirement for distribu-
tions to be similar reduces use-
fulness of data.
EMD function is difficult to com-
pute.
Strength Does not reduce the data useful-
ness.
Offers protection in cases where
sensitive attribute does not come
from uniform distribution.
Table 9 shows that l-Diversity and t-Closeness have both their strengths and weak-
nesses. While t-Closeness offers stronger protection to privacy than l-Diversity,
t-Closeness is more computationally more expensive than l-Diversity.
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2.5 Table Linkage
Record linkage and attribute linkage attacks are based on assumption that victim’s
record is already known to attacker. However, sometimes it is already enough when
attacker know whether or not victim is present in released table. This can happen
when the sensitive attribute in released data table is too specific. For example,
suppose that a hospital released data table of patients who are mentally ill. In
this case exact record does not matter to attacker anymore because no matter
what exact disease hs victim has, attacker will know that his victim is mentally
ill. In this case just knowing that fact that the victim is present in the data table
can already be damaging. The following chapters will discuss some methods to
mitigate record linkage attack [FWCY10].
Example 2.8. The following is adapted from [Man13] and illustrates where table
linkage could be used. Suppose that employer has two candidates to choose from.
Lets also suppose that there is a hospital that releases information about a disease
that what will cost extra money for an employee when he hires a person with that
disease. In that case employer might be interested in using that released data table
to pick a candidate that would cost him less.
2.5.1 -Differential Privacy
In 2006 Dwork proposed another privacy-preserving method called -differential
privacy, which says that threat to record owner’s privacy should not significantly
increase as a result of being present in a data table. -Differential privacy model
compares risk to record owner’s privacy before and after adding it to data table
[FWCY10].
Definition 2.7. (-Differential privacy) Let F br randomized function, T1 and
T2 be two datasets that differ exactly one record and S ⊆ Range(F ) a set of all
possible outputs of function F. A function F gives -differential privacy for all sets
T1 and T2 and all S ⊆ Range(F ) holds:∣∣∣∣ln P (F (T1)) = SP (F (T1)) = S
∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (2)
-Differential privacy guarantees to record owners that when they submit their sen-
sitive information to the database, there is either very little or nothing new that
attacker could learn from that data release about them. However, the downside of
-differential privacy is that does not protect against record linkage and attribute
linkage attacks [FWCY10].
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Achieving Differential Privacy Differential privacy is achieved by adding ran-
dom noise to query answer. In other words answer a = f(X) + b where f is query
function, X is database and b are some random noise from distribution that is
close to distribution on that sensitive attribute in database [Dwo06].
2.5.2 Distributional Privacy
Distributional privacy was proposed by Blum in 2008. It suggests that when
records in data table origin from some distribution then that table should only
reveal information about that specific distribution. Distributional privacy offers
stronger protection to privacy than -differential privacy however it has high com-
putational cost [FWCY10].
2.5.3 Comparison of Solutions
This chapter will compare -Differential privacy to Distributional privacy.
-Differential privacy is developed to estimate whether or not it is safe to add
given person to data release. It does not protect against record or attribute linkage.
Distributional privacy from the other hand does not try to answer the question
whether or not it is safe to add given person to data table but rather sets limitations
on what table in general can and what it cannot publish.
Table 10: Comparison table
Criteria -Differential privacy Distributional privacy
Purpose To limit the maximum risk to
data owner’s privacy when data
his record is added data release
To limit the information that
gets revealed by data release
within specific distribution.
Weakness Does not offer protection against
record linkage and attribute link-
age.
Computation is time consuming.
Strength Stronger privacy than -
differential privacy.
Table 10 offers side by side comparison of -Differential privacy and Distributional
privacy.
20
3 Anonymization Operations
So far we have discussed what needs to be done in order to achieve required
anonymity. In this chapter we are going to answer the research question "What
anonymization operations implement privacy-preserving methods".
It often happens that original table does not satisfy required anonymity criteria.
In this case data needs to be modified in a such way that privacy requirement
would be satisfied and at the same time data would still be useful for data miners.
Such operations that lead to privacy criteria fulfillment are called anonymization
operations. There are many different anonymization operations but in this mas-
ter’s thesis we are going to look at generalization, suppression, anatomization,
permutation, and perturbation [FWCY10].
3.1 Generalization and Suppression
Generalization and suppression operations are used to hide details in QID. For
example, we could generalize jobs such as tester, programmer and administrator
under information technology and jobs such as a surgeon, family doctor and nurse
could be generalized to medicine. If further generalization is needed information
technology and medicine could be generalized to any job. Such generalizations can
be represented using taxonomy trees. Likewise exact values such as weight or age,
for example, could be generalized to intervals. However, since in generalization
specific values will get replaced with more general values, data usefulness will de-
crease. Another weakness of Generalization is that the more columns there are in
QID, the more accuracy gets lost [FWCY10] [XT06].
Suppression works by replacing some values of QID with special value to indicate
that this record was not meant to be published or record could be left out of release
entirely [Pal14].
Figure 1 is the sample taxonomy tree that illustrates jobs generalization described
in the previous paragraph. Below we are going to give an overview of some gener-
alization schemes.
1. Full-domain generalization. This scheme requires that all values generalized
to same level of taxonomy tree. For example, when programmer is general-
ized to information technology then also surgeon needs to be generalized to
medicine. Because of this requirement, this method has highest distortion
[FWCY10].
2. Subtree generalization. For given non-leaf node either all or none of its child
nodes are generalized. For example, if tester is generalized to information
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Figure 1: Sample taxonomy tree of jobs (adapted from [FWCY10])
technology then programmer and developer should be also generalized. How-
ever children of medicine can be left specific [Pal14].
3. Sibling generalization is similar to subtree generalization with the difference
that it allows some nodes to be left un-generalized. For example if tester is
generalized then programmer and developer can be left specific. When some
value is generalized then all the other instances of this value must also be
generalized [Pal14].
4. Cell generalization is a little bit more flexible than other generalization
schemes. While the full-domain generalization, subtree generalization and
sibling generalization require all the instances of given value to be general-
ized, cell generalization allows some values to stay specific. For example, if
in table T there are two records that have same values for sensitive attribute
we can choose to generalize one record from programmer to information
technology, but keep an other record as programmer [Pal14].
First three schemes are called global recoding while the fourth one is called local
recoding [FWCY10].
3.2 Anatomization and Permutation
Anatomization is a method for anonymizing data release which overcomes the
weaknesses that generalization has. It works releasing data in two separate tables.
One table contains QID and an other table contains sensitive attribute. Both ta-
bles have group id column which can be used to join these two tables together.
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The table that contains QID groups is called QIT and table that contains sensi-
tive data is called ST. After applying an atomization technique to a data table,
an attacker would randomly have to guess sensitive attribute for a specific row
in QIT table. Since anatomization will keep sensitive attribute values unchanged,
data would be more useful for data miners. Since it keeps data unchanged, the
correlation between QID and the Sensitive attribute is also more accurate [XT06].
Permutation is similar to an atomization but it does not associate QID with the
sensitive attribute in case it has a numerical value. This disassociation is achieved
by shuffling values of the sensitive attribute within QID group [FWCY10].
3.3 Perturbation
Perturbation is known for its long history, simplicity and effectiveness. It works by
replacing original data with synthetic data which has similar statistical properties.
Attacker cannot gain sensitive information from perturbed data because it does
not correspond to original data. The downside of perturbation is that the data is
meaningless for humans and it is only useful for computing statistical properties
such as minimum, maximum, average, mean and so on. As a result of this, data
publisher could already just publish data mining results as well. Some perturba-
tion methods will be discussed below [FWCY10].
Additive noise is perturbation method that works by adding some random value
to original value so that statistical properties of the original table would not differ
too much from original ones. The downside of additive noise is that it does always
offer sufficient protection to sensitive attribute. For example, when there is high
correlation between QID and sensitive attribute and noise is low, the sensitive at-
tribute’s original value can be covered from perturbed data [FWCY10].
Data swapping is perturbation method that swaps sensitive attribute values with
each other.
Rank swapping is similar to data swapping but first the sensitive attribute values
will be divided into ranks and then the swapping is limited within one given rank.
In other words value from one rank cannot be swapped with value from an other
rank [FWCY10].
Synthetic data generation is an approach where a statistical model is built from
original data and then data table is generated based on that model by using sam-
pling. After that the synthetic data will be published instead of actual data.
Condensation works like synthetic data generation, but it first divides data into
groups and then generates synthetic data for each group such that statistical prop-
erties of generated data would match the statistical properties of original data in
that group [FWCY10].
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3.4 How Operations Help To Implement method
3.4.1 k-Anonymity
Generalization of QID attributes to more general value enables to reach k-
anonymity on QID size.
Suppression is not meant to be used alone, instead it should be used when after
other methods do not offer sufficient protection (*).
Anatomization does not modify original data but rather releases QID and ST in
different tables. Later those two tables are joined using group_id. So if we take
group size = k then we have k-anonymity.
Permutation contributes to k-Anonymity the same way that anatomization does
but it enhances privacy by swapping sensitive attribute values within each QID
group.
Perturbation is not directly related to k-Anonymity as it generates new synthetic
data instead of protecting data (*).
(*) The same applies for other privacy-preserving methods.
3.4.2 (X, Y)-Anonymity
Generalization is used to generalize specific data into QID groups.
Anatomization will lead to (X, Y) anonymity when we choose X to be QID and
Y to be a sensitive attribute. In that case we would require that each element
from X have at least k different matches from Y.
Permutation contributes to (X, Y)-Anonymity the same way that anatomization
does but it enhances privacy by swapping sensitive attribute values within each
QID group.
3.4.3 Multirelational k-Anonymity
In Multirelational k-Anonymity tables from relational database are first joined
together and after that Generalization, Suppression, Anatomization, Permutation
and Perturbation work exactly the same way as the work with k-anonymity.
3.4.4 l-Diversity
Generalization of attributes in QID will lead to large enough QID group that
can have at least l distinct sensitive attribute values.
Anatomization can be used to implement l-Diversity when we require that in
each group in ST there would be at least l distinct values.
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Permutation does not directly contribute to l-Diversity as l-Diversity sets re-
quirement on diversity of sensitive attribute but shuffling of sensitive attribute
values within same QID group would not change privacy in case of l-Diversity.
3.4.5 t-Closeness
In t-Closeness Generalization, Suppression, Anatomization, Permutation and Per-
turbation work exactly the same way as the work with l-Diversity.
3.4.6 -Differential Privacy
Generalization of attributes increases protection to privacy making it more dif-
ficult for attacker to learn whether or not victim is in data table.
Anatomization makes it more difficult to link victim with specific record.
Permutation has the same effect as anatomization but enhances privacy protec-
tion even more by swapping sensitive attribute values.
3.4.7 Distributional Privacy
Generalization methods that we have discussed so far do not offer any guarantee
that table would not leak info about other distributions.
3.5 Comparison of Solutions
In this chapter author of the thesis will compare different anonymization oper-
ation. In this master’s thesis author has discussed five different anonymization
operations. They all have purpose of protecting record owner against attacker but
they all work a little bit different.
Generalization changes some specific value in QID group to more general value
thus hiding individual in large QID group. The problem, however, is that modify-
ing values in QID will make data less useful for data miners.
Suppression is like generalization except that it completely hides some values.
It may also use special values to indicate that something is left unpublished. For
example, it could have minus one for weight value to indicate that it is not to be
published. This can make data mining more difficult since such will affect statis-
tical properties if they are not left out.
Anatomization from the other hand does not generalize or hide any value be-
hind some special value. Instead, it publishes all the data as it is but divides the
QID and sensitive attribute into two separate tables that both have group id in
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common. This, however, does not offer sufficient protection to privacy.
Permutation is a version of anatomization which shuffles sensitive attribute val-
ues within QID group, thus offering stronger protection for privacy than anato-
mization.
Perturbation is data anonymization operation that publishes synthetic data in-
stead of actual data. This will protect record owners because their actual data
will not be published at all. Instead of that, a table that is entirely generated will
be published. The negative side is that such data is uninteresting for humans.
Table 11: Comparison table
Criteria Generalization Suppression Anatomization Permutation Perturbation
Purpose Hide informa-
tion in QID.
To indicate that
some values are
not released.
Preserve data as
it is.
To overcome
weaknesses of
anatomization.
To keep original
data from being
published.
Weakness Will reduce the
usefulness of
data.
The more at-
tributes in QID,
the greater
information
loss.
Special value
is useless for
datamining and
dataminers.
Datamining
software must
be able to
handle special
values.
Unmodified
data in QIT and
ST is danger to
privacy.
Shuffling will
remove corre-
lation between
QID and sensi-
tive attribute.
Generating syn-
thetic data might
be difficult if data
mining tasks are
not known.
Additive noise
may not offer suf-
ficient protection
to privacy.
Strength Is flexible due
to different
generalization
schemes.
Offers strong
protection for
privacy
Preserves orig-
inal values of
sensitive at-
tribute will
cause datamin-
ing results to be
more accurate.
More accurate
correlation
between QID
and sensitive
attribute.
Stronger protec-
tion for privacy
since correlation
due to shuffling.
Has long history.
Simple.
Effective.
Preserves statisti-
cal information.
Table 11 offers side by side comparison of anonymization methods described in
this chapter. The advantage of generalization, suppression and perturbation is
that they keep data in a single table rather than splitting it into multiple tables.
The advantage of anatomization and permutation is that they offer a stronger
protection to privacy than generalization and suppression can offer. The advantage
of perturbation is that it protects the record owner’s privacy but the disadvantage
is that instead of actual data, synthetic data is published.
26
4 Prototype For Learning Privacy-Preserving Data
Publishing
This chapter will answer the research question "What is the prototype for learning
these privacy-preserving methods". A prototype is an educational software with
the purpose of helping students to better understand Privacy-Preserving Data
Publishing. This program allows users to select data table(s) and then guides it’s
users trough data anonymization process step-by-step. At each step, a user will be
explained why this step is necessary and what needs to be done in order to complete
this step. After going trough anonymization steps program will show the resulting
table and statistics about it. Users can learn about PPDP by going trough steps of
anonymization and comparing the results of anonymization operations. Prototype
is a Spring boot [Gut02] web application with Thymeleaf [Fer11] front-end. In
addition to Thymeleaf, also JavaScript [Eic95] frameworks such as jQuery [Res06],
jQuery UI [Bak07], jQuery table sorter [Bac07], ChartJS [Dow13] and jQuery File
Upload Plugin [Mor13] are used. JavaScript that is used by frontend is generated
by TypeScript [Mic12] and icons used in this program are from icones.pro [Coz09].
The program has sample data sets to demonstrate different attacks and to allow
students to experiment with different anonymization methods and parameters. A
user can access content via web browser at localhost:8080.
4.1 Scope
The PPDP learning tool is designed to allow users to use different anonymiza-
tion methods to anonymize data. This program allows users to practice data
anonymization with different parameters and learn how data usefulness and pri-
vacy change when anonymization parameters are changed. The primary purpose
of this software is help users to understand how different anonymization methods
work. This program is intended to let users to fill in required fields in each step
while displaying them instructions and hints. This program is not intended to
automatically go trough all steps for two reasons: firstly, students would think
and learn more about anonymization methods if they are asked to enter param-
eters themselves because then they would be actively engaged in process instead
of passively observing it and secondly because automatically filling in required
form fields often requires artificial intelligence which is not in scope of this master
thesis. Distributional privacy is out of the scope of this program as it defines the
required distribution of released table [FWCY10] but distribution theory is not
part of this thesis. The program will support the following anonymization meth-
ods: k-Anonymity, (X, Y)-Anonymity, MultiRelational k-Anonymity, l-Diversity,
t-Closeness and -differential privacy.
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4.2 Overall Description
This chapter will give a brief overview of the purpose of created prototype appli-
cation, describes the main characteristics of users of this prototype and specifies
assumptions and dependencies of this prototype application. The source code of
prototype can be found in Appendix 8.
4.2.1 Product Perspective
The product is a program that is created with primary intention to help users to
learn and understand how privacy-preserving methods work. PPDP study assis-
tant uses back-end to read tables from the disk and data anonymization related
operations are performed in front-end. PPDP study assistant goes trough differ-
ent steps of anonymization process giving explanations and hints on each step.
After anonymizing table it shows user anonymization result and statistics about
anonymized table.
Figure 2: PPDP study assistant Use Cases
Figure 2 shows that there are 5 major use cases. The use case 3 can be divided
into four subcategories. To see detailed use cases with Use Case Number, Use case
Name, Use Case Description, Primary Actor, Precondition, Trigger and Normal
Flow, see Appendix 6 Use cases.
4.2.2 User Characteristics
The main user of this program is a student who is learning PPDP. Student’s goal
is to learn how different anonymization operations anonymize data and how com-
bining them either increases or decreases anonymity. The author of this software
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assumes that users of this program have already basic understanding about PPDP.
Program author also assumes that users of this program are familiar how joining
tables in relational database work.
4.2.3 Assumptions and Dependencies
Since this application is written in Java, it is required that Java version 8 or newer
is installed. To run this web application it is required that TCP port 8080 is free
at the time if starting the program. Since the user interface is designed in HTML,
JavaScript and CSS it is required that user has browsers that support JavaScript.
4.3 Specific Requirements
This chapter will show the screenshots of the views of the program and explain
what user is able to do in each view, define the functional and non-functional
requirements.
4.3.1 Mock-ups
This chapter will show screenshots of different views in created prototype applica-
tion and under each screenshot explain what user can do in that view.
Figure 3: Main view
The main view shown on figure 3 is shown to a user when he starts the program,
with Import and Open buttons active. After a user has performed anonymization
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operations he will also see the resulting table and statistical information about the
anonymized table. Export to CSV button becomes active after opening a table. It
can be used to export table to CSV file. On the right side user will see information
about PPDP and instructions on how to use this program.
Figure 4: Open table view
Open table view shown on figure 4 will be shown after a user clicks on ’Open’
button in the main view. On the left side user will see the list of tables under
’Available tables’ header. In this list, both built-in and imported tables will be
shown. A user is able to select one or more tables by checking checkboxes in front
of table names. Under ’Preview of selected table’ a short preview of each selected
table is shown to help a user to know better what table(s) is he going to work with.
From table preview user can already see what are the column names in selected
table(s) and what kind of data is in selected table(s). This preview area will be
updated every time when a user checks or unchecks tables. In addition to that user
is also asked to specify anonymization method before he can continue. In case the
user selects -Differential Privacy, he will be asked to enter a value for  into input
that will become visible below anonymization method selection. On the right side
user will see a step-by-step tutorial on how to complete this step and explanations
on how different anonymization methods work and what they are for.
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Figure 5: Join table view
Join table view shown on figure 5 will be shown when a user has checked more than
one table in open table view. When a user selects only one table, this view will
be automatically skipped. This view allows a user to specify join rules in order
to work with relational tables. On the left user will see the tables that he had
previously checked in open table view. Below the header ’Preview of join’ user will
see the preview of the join operation. When the user has not defined any rules yet
a text ’No rules defined’ is shown. When a user clicks on ’Add rule’ button he will
be asked click on some column in the first table and then corresponding column
in the second table. In addition to that ’Add rule’ gets replaced with ’Ok’ button.
When a user clicks ’Ok’ program creates new joining rule based on selected column
names and updates preview of the join operation. In addition to that when a user
clicks ’Ok’ the ’Ok’ button changes back into ’Add rule’ and created rule will also
appear in the purple box under ’Add rule’ button. When it is possible to join
tables using the rule that is defined by a user then a user will see the result of
join operation below the header ’Preview of join’. If it is not possible to use that
rule to join the tables together, a user will see notification which says ’Rules are
defined but seem to be invalid. Please check your rules and remove any rules that
incorrect. Hint: can you expect Job to be equal to disease instead of join result. If
a user has defined a wrong rule, he can delete it by clicking delete button (which
is red X icon) inside rule box. On the right side user will see explanation on
MultiRelational k-Anonymity and joining columns and also a step-by-step tutorial
on how to complete this step.
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Figure 6: Attribute type specification view
Attribute type view shown on figure 6 will be shown after user has opened a table.
This view will allow user to specify attribute types for each attribute. Attribute
types are required to compute statistics and also as input for attribute actions view.
This view shows data table with attribute type selection below each attribute on
the left side. On the right side information about attribute types and step-by-step
instructions on how to complete this step is shown.
Figure 7: Attribute action specification view
Attribute action specification view shown on figure 7 allows user specify anonymiza-
tion operations for each attribute that is part of QID or that is non-sensitive. On
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the left side user will see the table that he is currently working on and specify
what action should be taken for each attribute. On the right side user will see an
explanation of possible actions and a step-by-step guide on how to complete this
step.
Figure 8: Generalization rules specification view
Generalization rules specification view shown on figure 8 allows user specify rules
for generalization for given attribute. On the left side user will see two options:
the first option is ’Generalize numeric value to intervals’ and second option is
’Generalize values’. The program will automatically choose the right option for
user. When the first option is selected, user will be asked to enter the size of the
interval. This means that all the values in this column are numbers and therefore
it is best to generalize them into intervals. When the second option is selected user
will be asked to generalize specific values to some more general value. This option
is selected when the column contains values that are not numbers. User will be
able to select values by clicking on purple boxes under ’Set generalization for this
rule’. After that user will be asked to specify a more general value for selected
values. For example on this screenshot ’Tallinn’ and ’Tartu’ are generalized to
’Large City’ This means that all occurrences of ’Tallinn’ and ’Tartu’ in city column
will become ’Large City’ and therefore become indistinguishable from each other.
Under the ’Working table’ header user will see the table on which he is currently
working on and highlighting shows the column for which he is currently specifying
generalization rules. The purpose of this table is to give user visual overview of the
table and to allow him to see values in context. On the right side user will see an
explanation about generalization and a step-by-step tutorial on how to complete
this step.
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Figure 9: Quiz
Quiz shown on figure 9 can be accessed by visiting clicking on "quiz" link on main
page 3. On quiz page users can see 9 tasks with multiple choice questions below
these tasks. Tasks are always in the same order but questions below tasks are
randomized each time user visits quiz page. After answering all questions a user
can click on submit button. If all questions are answered then a user will receive
feedback for the quiz where user answer is highlighted with green if it was the
correct answer and with red when it was a wrong answer. In case user selected a
wrong answer, the right answer for that question is highlighted with green. After
clicking Submit button user can see his score on top of the page. If he wishes to
retake the test he can click on ’Try again’ or if he wants to download feedback to
his computer he can click on ’Save results’.
4.3.2 Functional Requirements
This chapter specifies functional requirements of prototype application. Functional
requirements specify what user must be able to do with the data tables in this pro-
gram, how the program should interact with a user and what information should
be displayed to a user. All functional requirements have the following fields: Re-
quirement#, Requirement Type, Use case#, Description, Rationale, Created By,
Fit Criterion, Dependencies, Supporting Materials, Supporting Materials, Priority
and View id. Functional requirements in tabular form can be seen in appendix 4.
34
4.3.3 Nonfunctional Requirements
In this chapter author will specify nonfunctional requirements for given software.
Nonfunctional requirements specify understandability of instructions and user in-
terface and information it displays. These requirements also specify maximum
waiting time. All nonfunctional requirements have the following fields: Require-
ment#, Requirement Type, Use case#, Description, Rationale, Created By, Fit
Criterion, Supporting Materials, Priority and View id. Nonfunctional requirements
in the form of tables can be seen in appendix 5.
4.4 Back-end Description
In this chapter author will specify major concepts and components using a class
diagram. This program consists of two parts: front-end and back-end. The back-
end is used to allow front-end to have access to file system and to generate and
grade quizzes. Everything else that is not related to file system is done in front-end
part.
Figure 10: PPDP study assistant back-end class diagram
Figure 10 shows classes from back-end side that are used to manage .csv files.
PPDPController is a class that exposes SchemaManager functionality to web and
rest controllers. SchemaManager is used for listing and reading .csv files. It also
handles uploaded .csv files by using SchemaReader to read uploaded a .csv file
into memory and then adding it to schema list SchemaReader class is used to
read .csv files from resources folder into memory. Uploaded .csv files are turned
into InputStream and then read to memory using SchemaReader’s readSchema
method.
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Figure 11: PPDP study assistant back-end class diagram for quiz
Figure 11 shows classes from back-end side that handles quiz part. A Quiz class is
used to compose and check quiz. A quiz is made of tasks. Each task has at least
one multiple choice question. Every time quiz is composed a random question is
chosen for each task from the list of questions that belong to that specific task.
When a student submits a quiz, answers are sent as a list of Answer objects. Quiz
class then gives Feedback for each Answer, sending client back the list of Feedback.
4.5 Front-end Description
Front-end part requests the list of available tables from back-end. Later, when user
wants to use that specific table, it will send an other request to get the contents
of selected table. Not downloading all the tables at once helps to reduce network
traffic by not downloading tables that are not needed. Front-end guides users
trough different steps and the performs anonymization operations based on user
input. When user gets past the open table view, internet connection to back-end is
no longer required because the anonymization of data and computing the statistics
is done in front-end side.
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Figure 12: PPDP study assistant front-end class diagram
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Figure 12 shows classes in front-end side. Front-end starts from the Main class
which initializes Application and dialogs. Application class is used to interact with
back-end to get the list of available tables and to get the contents of a specific table
by its name. It has also functionality processing received tables and extracting
information from these. Frontend also has one class for each dialog that handles
rendering of that specific dialog and actions that can be performed in that dialog.
Anonymization class is used to anonymize data after the user has specified rules
for anonymization. Statistics class is used to generate descriptive statistics for
anonymized table.
4.6 Process Diagram
This chapter gives overview of anonymization process in PPDP study assistant.
Figure 13: PPDP study assistant process diagram
Figure 13 First user selects one or more table in open table view shown on figure
4. In case user selects two or more tables user will have to specify how to join
tables in join table view shown on figure 5. In case user only selects one table in
open table view or when he clicks next on join table view He will be shown he will
be asked to specify attribute types for each attribute in attribute type specifica-
tion view that is shown on figure 6. After that user is asked to specify attribute
actions using attribute actions specification view shown on figure 7. For each col-
umn for which generalization was specified, user is asked to specify generalization
rules using generalization rules specification view. After that program performs
anonymization operations using input received from user and displays the result.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the prototype for learning privacy-preserving data
publishing. We defined the scope and the goal of our prototype application. We
showed the screenshots of different views and explained what user can do in each
view. We specified functional and nonfunctional requirements for that prototype.
We created class diagrams for both back-end and front-end and explained how
they work. We did process diagram and described the workflow of prototype.
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5 Validation of the Prototype
In this chapter the author of the thesis will answer the question "What is usability
of the prototype". Since the purpose of this software is to help students to learn
and understand about PPDP the validation of this prototype will consist of two
parts:
1) 9 different tasks that students have to solve,
2) Feedback questionnaire.
The aim of the tasks is to test if students can learn PPDP using this prototype tool
and to test if they can use this tool independently. In addition to tasks, feedback
survey was used to estimate usability.
5.1 Tasks
Before the students were given tasks to solve independently they were given a 30
minutes long introduction to PPDP with demonstration of this software which
included solving of the first task. After completing each task, students had to
answer questions based statistics that will be shown after anonymizing te table.
These questions will test whether students understood instructions given by the
prototype application. Since this tool teaches PPDP by guiding students trough
different anonymization steps it is necessary to know whether or not students
who use this will understand these instructions and if they are able to solve tasks
independently with help of these instructions. In addition there are also questions
that will test students understanding of PPDP in general, to see if this tool helped
them to learn the main concepts and principles of PPDP.
5.1.1 Datasets
This prototype has built-in data sets for each privacy-preserving method. For
some data sets there are smaller data set and larger data set of the same data.
The purpose of different size data sets is to demonstrate that the same amount
of generalization can offer sufficient protection to privacy on larger datasets while
offering insufficient protection to smaller datasets. Detailed information about
datasets can be seen in appendix 3.
5.1.2 Tasks
Tasks were made with purpose to help students to better understand PPDP. To
complete the tasks students follow steps in each task. It was also required that
students read explanations that given to them by this program on the right side.
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After each task students had to answer the multiple choice questions at the end
of the task. After finishing all tasks students had to submit quiz answers via the
course web page. Tasks assumed that students used their knowledge from previ-
ous tasks and therefore each next task may have given less information than the
previous task. Students who could not figure out task were expected to memorize
what they did in the previous task or read the instructions given by this program.
If that did not help the were able to ask the practical class assistant. Tasks can
be seen in appendix 1.
5.2 Feedback Survey
In addition to tasks the author of this thesis also used survey questions to get
more feedback from students. Since the answers to tasks may not answer all the
questions about the usability of this application, additional feedback was used to
find out the following aspects:
1) Usefulness of this program in learning PPDP,
2) Usefulness of tasks and questions in learning PPDP,
3) Understandability of instructions, tasks, questions and statistics,
4) Understandability and learnability of program itself.
Feedback questions were presented as statements which students were able to agree
or disagree. each question had five possible answers 1-4 where 1 means strongly
disagree and 4 means strongly agree. The fifth option was "Don’t know" to indicate
that student either did not know how to answer this question or did not want to
answer it. Feedback questions can be seen in appendix 2.
5.3 Background of the Students
Students who used this software had all technical background. They were masters
students of cybersecurity and software engineering. The majority of these students
had finished their bachelor’s in computer science but some finished their bachelor’s
in some non-technical field and then started to study either cyber security or
software engineering masters.
5.4 Treatment of the Students
In University1 students received 30 minutes long lecture about privacy-preserving
data publishing. After the lecture, the first task was solved together by guiding
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students through each step. After solving the first task together we discussed the
answer to the first question together with students. After that students were asked
to solve the rest of the tasks independently.
In University2 students were not given any lecture on privacy-preserving data pub-
lishing. Instead of that they had to read about privacy-preserving data publishing
from [FWCY10]. In class they were not given any instructions on how to use this
program by lecturer and they had to learn to use this program on their own by
reading the instructions that were given to them by the program itself.
After finishing each task students had to answer the question for that task. After
answering all questions students were given feedback to their answers. After seeing
feedback students could either retake the quiz or download the feedback and submit
it to the course web page. After finishing the quiz students were also asked to
answer the questions in the feedback survey that can be seen at appendix 2. In
feedback survey, students were able to rate questions in four point scale where 1
was worst and 4 was worst rating. If students did not finish all tasks during the
class they had one week to finish the tasks at home.
5.5 Results from University1
The average score of all questions was 3.22. The lowest average was 2.64 for the
statement "You would like to use this program to prepare for the exam". The
second lowest average was for the statement "Statistics in this program were easy
to understand". The third lowest average was 3.07 for the statement "Questions in
quiz were easy to understand". The most likely reason for this was that second task
caused confusion. In second task students were asked to generalize gender attribute
to demonstrate that generalizing more attributes will increase the protection of
privacy. In the third task students were asked to generalize the way they did in
the second task but the actual right solution required that gender would be left
ungeneralized. It made many students to think that they had to generalize gender
in tasks three to nine also, but in fact, they had to keep gender attribute as it was
instead of generalizing. The issue about wording the tasks was verbally corrected
after it became evident and since there was planned one more practical with this
prototype in the other university, I also corrected tasks in handouts.
In addition to that, in class I also noticed that user interface was not correctly
rendered with all web browsers. The instructions area was wider than it should
have been and the working area was narrower than it should have been. That
bug rendered user interface inconvenient for those who had it. I tried to fix that
bug but I could not reproduce that bug after trying various different browsers on
different operating systems. In addition to that the observation also showed that
the majority of students managed to complete the tasks with out asking for help.
Since students were able to re-take quiz as many times as they wanted and edit
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the feedback to their attempt before submitting it, the quiz results should not
be taken very seriously. Quiz was graded in nine point scale. Quiz results were
submitted together with feedback survey via the course website. The majority of
students had 9 points out of 9. The lowest score that was submitted was 7 out of
9. The average score was 8.81. Since many students manually added their name
to quiz feedback, which required editing the HTML code, there is no guarantee
that the scores submitted were actual scores. However out of those few who had
scored less than 9 out of 9 had mainly mistakes in the seventh question which was
about l-diversity.
5.6 Results from University2
In University2 the average score of all feedback questions was 3.16 which is higher
than the average score of feedback questions in University1. The lowest average
was 2.4 for the statement "Questions in quiz were easy to understand". The second
lowest average was 2.6 for the statement "You would like to use this program to
prepare for the exam". For quiz part all students received 9 points of 9. Average
scores for feedback questions can be seen from appendix 7.Figure 14 shows that
in University2 the median of scores was higher than scores in the University1. On
figure 14, the box of the University1 is shorter than the box of University2 which
means that suggests that in the University1 students opinions were more similar
to each other than in University2.
5.7 Comparison of Results
The average score of all questions was quite similar in both universities. In both
universities 3 was most common answer for feedback questions. In University1
the average score of feedback questions was 3.22 and in University2 it was 3.16.
In both results statements "You would like to use this program to prepare for
the exam" and "Questions in quiz were easy to understand" had lowest scores.
However in University2 the score for the statement "Questions in quiz were easy
to understand" was 2.4 which was significantly lower than the score for that same
question in University1 which was 3.07. Average scores for feedback questions can
be seen from appendix 7.
Below is the box plot [MSvCS] that was generated in R language [IG93] to compare
the results from University1 and University2.
42
Figure 14: Box plot of results from University1 and University2.
Figure 14 shows that in University2 the median of scores was higher than scores in
the University1. On figure 14, the box of the University1 is shorter than the box of
University2 which means that suggests that in the University1 students opinions
were more similar to each other than in University2.
5.8 Threats to Validity
There are different threats to the validity of results. The first threat is that ques-
tions in feedback survey may not reveal all the benefits or problems of this program.
The second threat to validity is that a prototype application allowed students to
retake tests as many times as they wanted which means that feedback to tasks
may not truthfully reveal students knowledge. Students who wanted to get good
points could have retaken the quiz until they have tried all different answers and
then use the feedback from previous attempts to correctly fill in the last attempt.
The third threat to validity is that since this quiz results are not saved in database
but rather exported from the prototype application in HTML format, they could
have manually edited the .html that contained the results and then submit cor-
rected feedback instead of original. The fourth threat to validity is that multiple
choice questions limit the opportunities of testing the knowledge because the op-
tions were specified which simplified answering the questions compared to letting
students fill in the input with text. The fifth threat to validity is that students
may fill in feedback survey randomly. The sixth threat is the shortage of students
who tested this program in University2. In University2 this program was used by
five students which means that the average scores may not truthfully reflect the
actual average.
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis we discussed threats to privacy such as record linkage, attribute
linkage and table linkage that could occur when personal data is collected and
published without any protection. We discussed and compared different privacy-
preserving methods such as k-Anonymity, (X, Y)-Anonymity, Multirelational k-
Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-closeness, -Differential privacy and Distributional pri-
vacy and highlighted their strengths and weaknesses. We discussed how these
privacy-preserving methods could be implemented and then we wrote educational
purpose software that allowed students to learn about privacy-preserving data
publishing. Finally we created tasks that students had to solve using this soft-
ware and feedback survey to measure how useful created software was for learning
privacy-preserving data publishing.
In addition to writing educational software and creating tasks and feedback survey
we also gave an introductory lecture to privacy-preserving data publishing and
my software in the lecture of Principles of Secure Software Design course and in
practical class we gave students tasks to solve independently.
The results of using this prototype application snow that in general this application
is suitable for teaching students privacy-preserving data publishing. However, this
program needs some enhancements before using it in class. First, the quiz results
should be stored in database to avoid the manipulating with feedback. Secondly,
bugs from the user interface should be removed.
6.1 Limitations
In this thesis we focused on data sets that have single sensitive attribute however
in real life data sets could contain multiple sensitive attributes. This thesis did
not offer a solution to such cases. Another limitation of this thesis is the selection
of privacy-preserving methods. In this thesis we only discussed 6 different privacy
preserving methods but [FWCY10] alone already mentioned 15 different privacy-
preserving methods.
The prototype application supports k-Anonymity, (X, Y)-Anonymity, Multire-
lational k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-closeness and -Differential privacy. From
anonymization operations that were described in this thesis the prototype only
supports generalization. Another limitation of the prototype is that it is possible
for users to cheat the in quiz by manipulating with the quiz feedback since results
are not stored in database but directly displayed to user after he submits the quiz.
6.2 Answers to Research Questions
In this thesis we had four research questions for which we provide short answers:
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RQ1: What are the risks of publishing personal data and what methods can be
used to mitigate these risks? When personal data is used with out any protection,
the following attacks could occur: record linkage, attribute linkage or table linkage.
There are different privacy-preserving methods which can mitigate these risks of
which in this thesis we discussed k-Anonymity, (X, Y)-Anonymity, Multirelational
k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-closeness, -Differential privacy and Distributional pri-
vacy.
RQ2: What anonymization operations implement privacy-preserving methods?
In this thesis we discussed five different ways to implement these methods: gen-
eralization, suppression, anatomization, permutation, and perturbation. Each of
these methods have their own advantages and disadvantages.
RQ3: What is the prototype for learning these privacy-preserving methods? The
prototype is Spring Boot web application which allows users to learn about privacy-
preserving data publishing. Users can learn about privacy-preserving data pub-
lishing by reading the instructions that are given to them by this prototype and
by solving the tasks that are provided by this prototype.
RQ4: What is usability of the prototype? This prototype was used in two universi-
ties where students had to solve the tasks and also answer the feedback questions.
Although it is possible to cheat the quiz, the observation in class showed that
majority of students managed complete the tasks without asking for help. After
finishing tasks students also had to fill in the feedback survey where they had to
rate different aspects of this prototype from 1 to 4 where 1 was worst and 4 was
worst. The most frequently used answer was 3.
6.3 Conclusion
The experiments with the prototype in two universities showed that the prototype
is usable for learning about privacy-preserving data publishing. Feedback survey
results showed that majority of students found that this prototype helped them to
learn about privacy-preserving data publishing. However feedback survey showed
that questions in quiz should be improved in order to increase the usefulness of
this prototype.
6.4 Future Work
In addition to that other privacy-preserving methods with their implementations
could be discussed and software could be updated to include these methods. For
example in this thesis we discussed the following data anonymization methods:
generalization, suppression, anatomization, permutation and perturbation but in
implemented software students and can currently only use generalization. It would
be interesting to see all of these implemented. An other topic that was left out of
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this thesis was measuring the data usefulness. This topic is good for future work
because it measuring the usefulness of anonymized data would help to estimate if
anonymized data is generalized too much or not.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 Tasks
Task 1: (sample)
1) Open table Job_Large and select k-Anonymity as anonymization method.
2) Click Next.
3) Define attribute types. Read the instructions (Introduction and Getting Started)
on right hand side. Think what type should each attribute (column) be and select
right attributes.
In case you are confused, here is the list of attribute types: name - ID, last name
- ID, age - QID, gender - QID, city - QID and job - Sensitive.
4) Click next
5) You are now asked to specify attribute actions for each attribute. Note that
some attributes are already preselected based on your choices in previous step.
However you still have to specify attribute actions for age gender and city. Again,
first thing that you need to do is read the explanations on right hand side. Think
what action should be done to each attribute.
In case you are stuck, here are actions: age - Generalize, gender - Keep as is (can
you guess why?) and city - generalize.
6) Click next
7) You are now asked to specify interval size for values in column age. Again first
thing to do is to read instructions of right hand side to get a better overview of
what you need to do.Enter 10 and click Next.
8) Now you are asked to generalize city names. In real life situation, a more gen-
eral value should be something that is common for all specific values. However in
these tasks we care more about getting few groups that are about equal in size
than about good general value.
8.1) Click on city names that could belong to one group and then click on Set
generalization rule and enter some general value.
8.2) Repeat step 8.1 until you have no city names left.
In this sample task we are going to define the following rules:
Tallinn,Tartu,Paide->Large city
Viljandi,Türi,Jõgeva->Medium city
Vändra,Rapla,Põltsamaa,Elva->Small city
8.3) Click Next.
9) You should now see the resulting table. Since this is the sample task you do
not have to submit result of this task.
If you did everything correctly, you should see the following information about
QIDs
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Unique QIDs: 29
Smallest QID group: 2
Largest QID group: 14
Since the smallest QID group contains only 2 different people this table is only
2-anonymous.
question 1:
Does 2-anonymos table offer sufficient protection?
1) Yes, because generalizing QID values make it difficult to find specific person
from given table.
2) No, because with 2-anonymous table sensitive attribute value can be easily
guessed (with 50% confidence).
Task 2:
After solving first task, you ended up with having 2-anonymous table. However
2-anonymous table may not offer sufficient protection to privacy. Your task is to
come up with a better solution. For example 5-anonymous table would be already
better.
1) Follow steps 1-8 from first task but this time, let’s generalize gender values male
and female to any gender.
We only generalize gender in this task to any gender in this task. In the following
tasks we do not generalize or remove gender.
Question 1:
Did protection to privacy increase?
1) Yes, because there are larger QID groups.
2) No, because we used the same table as we did in previous task.
Question 2: This time table is:
1) Still 2-anonymous because we used the same table as previous time.
2) 3-anonymous because we generalized 3 columns instead of 2.
3) 5-anonymous.
4) Something else.
Question 3:
How many different persons are in smallest QID group?
1) We cannot know this because QID hides person specific details.
2) We cannot know because two persons with same explicit identifier could in same
group
3) 5 because this table is 5-anonymous.
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Task 3:
By now you should have learned what to do when you need to increase the pro-
tection to privacy. Now lets see an other factor that plays part in protection for
table. In task 2, you anonymized table that had 200 records. Now let’s look at
table that has 20 records.
1) Open table Job (not Job_Large)
2) Do everything else like you did in task 1 to increase protection to privacy (select
same types, same actions and specify same generalization rules as you did in task 1.
Question 1:
Let a and b be two tables. How does the size of table affect protection to anonymity
given that the only difference is that table a has more rows than table b?
1) Table a is less anonymous because is has more rows than table b.
2) Table a is more anonymous because it has more rows than table b and therefore
bigger QID groups will form.
3) table size doesn’t matter.
Question 2:
This table is:
1) 2-anonymous.
2) 5-anonymous.
3) Same as previous time because we used same parameters as previous time
4) More anonymous than previous time because we used smaller table this time
Task 4:
We have so far anonymized tables where each row represents one person. However
in some cases it could be that one person is present in multiple rows.
1) Go to Open table view.
2) On right side, scroll down to (X, Y)-Anonymity and read about (X, Y)-Anonymity.
3) Choose table Disease_xy.
4) This table is about different diseases that people have. One person can have
one or more diseases. Using this hint choose proper anonymization method and
click Next.
5) By now we expect that you already know what column types to choose. Choose
right column type for each column and click next. If you have forgotten them, you
can read about attribute types in right panel.
6) Choose proper actions for each attribute.
7) Generalize the values. Interval size for age: 10, all cities to estonia.
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Question 1:
How many unique people are in smallest QID group?
1) 6
2) 8
3) 26
Question 2:
Suppose that X = {age, gender, city} and Y = {personId}. Suppose that this
table satisfies (X, Y)-Anonymity for integer k=4. Suppose that each person has
exactly 2 diseases. How many rows are there in smallest QID?
1) 1
2) 2
3) 3
4) 4
5) 6
6) 8
Question 3:
X= {age, gender, city} and Y = {_id}, anonymized table satisfies (X,Y)-Anonymity
for k=
1) 1
2) 6
3) 8
4) 26
Task 5:
So far we have looked data sets that consist of single table, however in real life
data is often stored in relational database.
1) Go to Open table view and on the right panel read about MultiRelational k-
anonymity.
2) Select Job_Relational and Person_Relational.
3) MultiRelational k-anonymity is automatically selected for you. Click Next.
4) You are now asked to Join selected tables. Read the instructions on right hand
side. Getting started will tell you what to do.
5) Add required rule(s). Click Next.
6) Specify attribute types and attribute actions.
Hint: id is unique identifier, you dont have to worry about name and last name
(Not Defined), you can choose to remove them (Remove column).
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7) Generalize age to interval size of 10.
Question 1:
What is the correct attribute type for column id?
1) ID
2) QID
3) Sensitive
4) Non-Sensitive
Question 2:
What could go wrong if relational data is anonymized before joining?
1) Nothing, the order of performing these activities does not matter.
2) Data could be distorted too much.
3) Insufficient protection could be offered.
4) Both can happen: data could be too distorted or privacy might be insufficiently
protected.
Task 6:
Introducing additional requirement for better privacy protection.
1) In Open table view, read about l-Diversity.
2) Select table Job_Large_Monotonous and anonymization method l-Diversity.
3) Specify attribute types and actions.
4) Use these generalization rules:
Interval for age: 10
City names:
Tallinn,Tartu,Paide->Large city
Viljandi,Türi,Jõgeva->Medium city
Vändra,Rapla,Põltsamaa,Elva->Small city
Hint: if you don’t wish to click on city names that much you can copy-paste these
three lines above.
Question 1:
ow many different sensitive attribute values are in the QID group that contains
the least amount of unique sensitive attribute values contains?
1) 1
2) 2
3) 6
4) 30
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Question 2:
On the top of the anonymized table you can see a red QID group that contains 6
different persons. Does this group offer sufficient protection to the privacy if table
is required to be 5-anonymous?
1) Yes because QID with size of 6 also satisfies requirement of 5-anonymity.
2) No because even tough QID group contains enough records, sensitive attribute
can be successfully guessed.
Question 3:
On the top of the anonymized table you can see a red QID group that contains 6
different persons. Is there anything wrong with that group?
1) No, it’s fine because the size of this QID group is good enough.
2) Yes, the sensitive attribute for this QID group can be guessed with 100% con-
fidence and therefore the size of QID does not help.
Task 7:
Introducing additional requirement for better privacy protection 2.
1) Do steps 1-4 from Task 6 but this time choose Job_Large instead of Job_Large_Monotonous.
Question 1:
Suppose that person x is 60-70 years old female from small city who works as
a Therapist(scroll down if you need) and that job is the sensitive attribute that
needs to be kept private. What’s the probability of guessing her’s sensitive at-
tribute when her’s QID is known?
1) 1/1
2) 1/2
3) 1/3
4) 1/8
5) 1/10
6) 1/29
Question 2:
Why is diversity of sensitive attribute required?
1) Because the greater the diversity the harder to guess the value of sensitive at-
tribute.
2) It actually doesn’t matter, only thing that matters is the size of QID group.
Question 3:
This table is:
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1) 1-diverse.
2) 2-diverse.
3) 4-diverse.
4) 8-diverse.
5) 10-diverse.
6) 29-diverse.
Task 8:
Do the same as you did in previous task, except now select t-closeness instead of
l-diversity. Read about t-closeness if you haven’t already.
Question 1:
On the anonymized table, light red marks the QID group where distribution of
sensitive attribute is not close enough to distribution of sensitive attribute in the
table. Red rows are rows that ruin the distribution of sensitive attribute for given
QID groups. What can be said?
1) The distribution of sensitive attribute in QID group mostly matches the distri-
bution of sensitive attribute in the rest of the table.
2) The distribution of sensitive attribute in QID group mostly does not match the
distribution of sensitive attribute in the rest of the table.
Task 9
Sometimes generalizing QID attributes is not enough. For example in a company
salary might be a confidential information. It is possible, that boss who knows
QID and salary of his employees and wants to find out if any of his employees have
participated in questionnaire about salaries. Since salary was declared confiden-
tial, participation in such list could harm employee’s relationship with employee.
1) In Open table view, read about -Differential privacy.
2) Select table Job_Large_Salary and anonymization method -Differential pri-
vacy.
3) In attribute types specification view look at salaries.
4) Specify attribute types and actions.
5) generalize age and city as in previous tasks.
Hint: Job can be Non-sensitive this time.
Question 1:
What did happen to salary values?
1) Nothing because sensitive attribute is not generalized.
2) They were changed by +/- ; % of their value.
55
Question 2:
What does -Differential privacy offer that k-anonymity doesn’t?
1) Nothing, they are interchangeable.
2) -Differential privacy will add additional protection by shifting the value of
sensitive attribute which improves privacy.
Appendix 2 Feedback Questions
Thank you for using this software to learn privacy-preserving data publishing. I
would like to collect your feedback for this tool to evaluate it’s usefulness and
usability. Please circle the option you would like to choose.
Table 12: Feedback questions.
Please indicate the extent to
which you agree with following
statement.
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
Don’t
know
1. Using program helped to learn
about privacy-preserving data pub-
lishing.
1 2 3 4 -
2. Program helped to understand
the difference between anonymiza-
tion methods.
1 2 3 4 -
3. Program was easy to learn. 1 2 3 4 -
4. Program was easy to understand. 1 2 3 4 -
5. Program was easy to remember. 1 2 3 4 -
6. You would like to use this program
to prepare for the exam.
1 2 3 4 -
7. Instructions given by this program
helped to solve the tasks.
1 2 3 4 -
8. Instructions given by this program
were easy to follow.
1 2 3 4 -
9. Instructions given by this program
were easy to remember.
1 2 3 4 -
10. Tasks were easy to follow. 1 2 3 4 -
11. Solving tasks helped to under-
stand privacy-preserving data pub-
lishing better.
1 2 3 4 -
12. Questions in quiz were easy to
understand.
1 2 3 4 -
13. Questions in quiz helped to learn
privacy-preserving data publishing.
1 2 3 4 -
14. Statistics at the right of
anonymized table were helpful for
answering the questions in quiz.
1 2 3 4 -
15. Statistics in this program were
easy to understand.
1 2 3 4 -
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Appendix 3 Dataset Descriptions
Built-in Datasets
Dataset 1:
Name: Job
Description: A small table about different jobs.
Purpose: To demonstrate that anonymization methods do not offer good protec-
tion with small tables.
Dataset 2:
Name: Job_Large
Description: A large table about different jobs.
Purpose: To demonstrate that anonymization methods offer good better protec-
tion with large dataset than with small tables.
Dataset 3:
Name: Person_rel, Job_rel
Description: A relational dataset about job. Person_rel is a person specific table
and Job_rel is a job specific table. These tables are not meant to be used alone
but to be joined together using id attribute.
Purpose: To demonstrate how anonymizing relational datasets (Multi Relational
k-Anonymity) works.
Dataset 4:
Name: Disease_xy
Description: A table about different diseases. In this table same person can be
present in multiple rows.
Purpose: To demonstrate (X, Y)-Anonymity.
Dataset 5:
Name: Job_Large_Salary
Description: A table about different jobs and their salaries.
Purpose: To demonstrate -Differential privacy.
Dataset 6:
Name: Job_Large_Monotonous
Description: Monotonous table about jobs.
Purpose: To demonstrate that the lack of diversity of sensitive attribute could
lead to threat to privacy.
Dataset 7:
Name: Job_Large_Skewed
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Description: Skewed table of jobs.
Purpose: To demonstrate that l-Diversity does not offer very good protection to
privacy in case of skewed data in sensitive attribute.
Appendix 4 Functional Requirements
Table 13: Functional requirement 1
Requirement# 1
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 2
Description User must be able open tables.
Rationale Program needs to know which table user wants to work on.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement will be fulfilled when user can see and select
tables that are imported into program.
Dependencies All other requirements.
Supporting Materials
Priority High
View id Figure 4
Table 14: Functional requirement 2
Requirement# 2
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 1
Description User must be able to import his own table.
Rationale User might be interested in running anonymization algorithms on
his own table instead of built in tables.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion For this requirement to be fulfilled:
1) User must be able to import his data table to program.
2) Imported table must be listed in open table view.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials
Priority Medium
View id Figure 3
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Table 15: Functional requirement 3
Requirement# 3
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3.1
Description Program must support relational tables.
Rationale In real life situations, data is often kept in relational databases
and therefore it is necessary to support relational data.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when:
1) Open table view allows user to select multiple, tables
2) Program asks user how it should join selected tables together.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials [FWCY10]
Priority Medium
View id Figure 5
Table 16: Functional requirement 4
Requirement# 4
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3.3
Description Program must enable user to specify anonymization operations
for each attribute.
Rationale In order for program to know how to perform anonymization op-
erations user has to tell it explicitly what to do with each column.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when after opening (and joining if
necessary) a table a program asks user to specify anonymization
operations for each attribute.
Dependencies 5 and 6
Supporting Materials
Priority High
View id Figure 7
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Table 17: Functional requirement 5
Requirement# 5
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3.2
Description Program must enable user to specify attribute types for each at-
tribute.
Rationale Program needs to know attribute types in order to calculate statis-
tics later. Also some of the data in next steps can be automatically
filled in when attribute types are known.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when after opening (and joining if
necessary) a table a program asks user to specify anonymization
operations for each attribute.
Dependencies 5 and 6
Supporting Materials
Priority High
View id Figure 6
Table 18: Functional requirement 6
Requirement# 6
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3.3
Description Program must support the following anonymization operations:
generalization, suppression, anatomization, permutation and per-
turbation.
Rationale Anonymization operations are essential to protect the privacy.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when all these operations are se-
lectable and program properly handles them.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials [FWCY10]
Priority High
View id Figure 7
Table 19: Functional requirement 7
Requirement# 7
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 4
Description Program must display statistics about table.
Rationale Ability to see some statistics about table will add educational
value to this software as users can compare protection to privacy
before and after running anonymization operations.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when software will display statistics
after applying anonymization operations.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials
Priority High
View id Figure 3
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Table 20: Functional requirement 8
Requirement# 8
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 5
Description Program must enable user to export anonymized table into CSV
file.
Rationale Allowing users to export resulting table into CSV file would allow
them to compare the outputs and further use these in their own
data mining applications
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when after applying anonymization
operations program displays download button.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials
Priority Medium
View id Figure 3
Table 21: Functional requirement 9
Requirement# 9
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3.3
Description Program must enable user to exclude columns from table
Rationale Some information such as first and last name or social security
number is to be removed.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when user is able to choose "Remove"
as anonymization operation for given column.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials [FWCY10]
Priority High
View id Figure 7
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Table 22: Functional requirement 10
Requirement# 10
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3
Description User must be able to choose replacement values for each suppres-
sion rule.
Rationale In suppression method, value gets replaced by special value to
indicate that this value is not to be released. However in different
situations we need different special values. For example sometimes
it may be fine to replace string value with empty string but some
other time there might be need to replace it with NULL.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when after applying anonymization
operations program will ask replacement value for each record for
which suppression is needed.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials [FWCY10]
Priority High
View id
Table 23: Functional requirement 11
Requirement# 11
Requirement Type Functional
Use case# 3.4
Description User must be able to specify generalization rules.
Rationale In order for program to know generalize data, user must tell it
how to do it.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when before applying anonymization
operations program will ask replacement rules for each attribute
for which generalization has been chosen.
Dependencies
Supporting Materials [FWCY10]
Priority High
View id Figure 8
Appendix 5 Nonfunctional Requirements
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Table 24: Nonfunctional requirement 1
Requirement# 12
Requirement Type Nonfunctional
Use case#
Description Users should not require manual for using this program.
Rationale Users may loose their interest in program that is difficult to use.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when 90% or more of users are able
to use this program by reading instructions given to them by the
program itself with out asking for help.
Priority Medium
View id Figure 3
Table 25: Nonfunctional requirement 2
Requirement# 13
Requirement Type Nonfunctional
Use case#
Description Error messages should be understandable.
Rationale Error messages such as "Column type not specified" generally
result in better user experience than just saying NullPointerEx-
ception
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when 90% or more of users are able
to resolve problems without asking help.
Priority Medium
View id Figure 4
Table 26: Nonfunctional requirement 3
Requirement# 14
Requirement Type Nonfunctional
Use case#
Description Anonymizing operations on built-in datasets should not take more
than one second.
Rationale Program that works fast will result in better user satisfaction.
Created By Author
Fit Criterion This requirement is fulfilled when applying anonymization opera-
tions and generating resulting table to any of built-in data table
takes less than a second.
Priority Medium
View id Figure 4
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Table 27: Nonfunctional requirement 4
Requirement# 15
Requirement Type Nonfunctional
Use case#
Description Information that is displayed should be meaningful.
Rationale
Created By Author
Fit Criterion
Priority Medium
View id
Appendix 6 Use Cases
Table 28: Use case 1
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 1
Use case Name Table management - import table.
Use Case Description User imports CSV file into program.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running
Postcondition CSV file is imported into program and user can select it from open
table view.
Trigger User’s need for anonymizing custom table.
Normal Flow 1) User goes to main view.
2) User clicks on ’Import’.
3) User chooses file and clicks open.
4) Contents of CSV file is loaded into program.
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Table 29: Use case 2
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 2
Use case Name Table management - open non-relational table.
Use Case Description User opens table that is imported to program.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running and table must be opened.
Postcondition User is in attribute type specification view.
Trigger Need to anonymize table.
Normal Flow 1) User goes to main view.
2) User clicks ’open’.
3) User selects a table.
4) User selects anonymization method.
5) User clicks ’Next’.
6) User will see a attribute types view.
Table 30: Use case 3
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 2
Use case Name Table management - open relational table
Use Case Description User opens relational table that is composed of other tables.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running.
Postcondition User is in join table view.
Trigger Need to anonymize relational data.
Normal Flow 1) User goes to main view.
2) User clicks ’open’.
3) User selects two or more tables.
4) User selects anonymization method.
5) User clicks ’Next’.
6) User will see a join table view.
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Table 31: Use case 3.1
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 3.1
Use case Name Table anonymization - joining relational tables.
Use Case Description User joins relational table into one.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running.
Postcondition Tables are joined into one table and user proceeds from attribute
types specification view with the table he got by joining tables
together.
Trigger Need to anonymize relational data.
Normal Flow 1) User is in join table view.
2) User clicks ’Add rule’.
3) User clicks on identifier column in one table.
4) User clicks on corresponding identifier column in second
table.
5) User clicks ’Ok’.
6) If necessary user repeats steps 2 to 5.
7) User clicks ’Next’.
8) Program has joined tables together and user is in specify
attribute types specification view.
Table 32: Use case 3.2
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 3.2
Use case Name Table anonymization - specify attribute types.
Use Case Description User specifies attribute type for each attribute.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running table must be opened. In case of rela-
tional data UC 3.1 must be performed.
Postcondition Attribute types are specified and user is in attribute actions spec-
ification view.
Trigger Program needs to know attribute types in order to work properly.
Normal Flow 1) User is in select column type view.
2) User selects column type for each column.
3) User user clicks ’Next’.
4) User is in attribute actions specification view.
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Table 33: Use case 3.3
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 3.3
Use case Name Table anonymization - specify attribute actions
Use Case Description User specifies actions to be taken to each column.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running and attribute types must be specified.
Postcondition Attribute actions are specified and user will see generalization
rules specification view for each attribute for which extra input is
needed from user.
Trigger Program needs to know for each attribute, which action it needs
to apply to it.
Normal Flow 1) User is in specify column actions view.
2) User chooses anonymization methods for each column.
3) User clicks ’Next’.
4) User will see generalization view for each attribute for
which generalization was chosen as attribute action.
Table 34: Use case 3.4
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 3.4
Use case Name Table anonymization - generalization rules for numerical values
Use Case Description User specifies generalization rules for attribute that has numerical
values.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running and attribute actions must be specified.
Postcondition Program has performed the anonymization operations and user
will see anonymized table with statistics.
Trigger Program needs to know how to exactly generalize data.
Normal Flow 1) User is in generalization rules specification view.
2) Option ’Generalize numeric value to intervals’ is selected.
3) User enters interval size.
4) User clicks ’Next’.
5) If there are any attributes left for which generalization rules
are needed, user will see generalization view for next at-
tributes for which generalization rules are needed. Other-
wise program will anonymize the table and user will see the
anonymized table and related statistics.
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Table 35: Use case 3.4
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 3.4
Use case Name Table anonymization - generalization rules for categorical values
Use Case Description User specifies generalization rules for column that has numerical
values.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running and attribute actions must be specified.
Postcondition Program has performed the anonymization operations and user
will see anonymized table with statistics.
Trigger Program needs to know how to exactly generalize data.
Normal Flow 1) User is in generalization rules specification view.
2) Option ’Generalize values’ is selected.
3) User clicks on values that are in same category.
4) User clicks on ’Set generalization for this rule’.
5) User enters more general value for values that were selected
in step 3.
6) User repeats steps 3 to 5 until there are no unused values
left.
7) User clicks ’Next’.
8) If there are any columns left for which generalization rules
are needed, user will see generalization view for next col-
umn for which generalization rules are needed. Otherwise
program will anonymize the table and user will see the
anonymized table and related statistics.
Table 36: Use case 4
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 4
Use case Name Statistics - view statistics.
Use Case Description User views statistics about anonymized table.
Primary Actor User.
Precondition Program must be running and attribute actions must be specified.
Postcondition Program has performed the anonymization operations and user
will see anonymized table with statistics.
Trigger Program needs to know how to exactly generalize data.
Normal Flow 1) User has performed anonymization operations on table.
2) Statistics will be visible next to anonymized table in main
view.
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Table 37: Use case 5
Use Case Element Description
Use Case Number 5
Use case Name Table management - export table.
Use Case Description User exports anonymized table into CSV file.
Primary Actor User
Precondition Program must be running and anonymized table must be dis-
played in main view.
Postcondition CSV file is saved on disk.
Trigger User’s need to save anonymized table.
Normal Flow 1) User has performed anonymization operations on table.
2) User clicks ’Export to CSV’.
3) User chooses file destination.
4) table is saved on specified destination.
Appendix 7 Summary of Results
The following table summarizes the results.
Table 38: Feedback questions scores.
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with
following statement.
Average
(University1)
Average
(University2)
1. Using program helped to learn about privacy-preserving
data publishing.
3.42 3.60
2. Program helped to understand the difference between
anonymization methods.
3.24 3.40
3. Program was easy to learn. 3.28 3.40
4. Program was easy to understand. 3.23 3.60
5. Program was easy to remember. 3.33 3.40
6. You would like to use this program to prepare for the exam. 2.64 2.60
7. Instructions given by this program helped to solve the tasks. 3.57 3.80
8. Instructions given by this program were easy to follow. 3.47 2.80
9. Instructions given by this program were easy to remember. 3.13 2.80
10. Tasks were easy to follow. 3.40 3.40
11. Solving tasks helped to understand privacy-preserving data
publishing better.
3.24 3.60
12. Questions in quiz were easy to understand. 3.07 2.40
13. Questions in quiz helped to learn privacy-preserving data
publishing.
3.10 2.80
14. Statistics at the right of anonymized table were helpful for
answering the questions in quiz.
3.18 3.00
15. Statistics in this program were easy to understand. 3.05 2.80
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Appendix 8 Source Code
The source code of prototype application can be found from:
https://github.com/rain1/Privacy-Preserving-Data-Publishing
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